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GRANHOLM V. HEALD: THE TWENTYFIRST AMENDMENT TAKES ANOTHER HIT
WHERE DO STATES GO FROM HERE?
WILLIAM GLUNZ*

INTRODUCTION

Currently, thirty States and the District of Columbia allow
direct shipment of wine to consumers.2
Some allow direct
shipping with few restrictions. Other States offer reciprocity for
wine shipped from States that have laws that allow direct
shipping to those States.4 On the other end of the spectrum,
twenty States prohibit the direct shipment of wine to consumers
entirely.! During its most recent term, the United States Supreme
Court struck down Michigan and New York laws prohibiting direct
shipment, holding that they discriminated against interstate

commerce in Granholm v. Heald.6
Despite passage of the Eighteenth Amendment, which created
prohibition at the national level,7 throughout much of the history
of our Nation, state regulation of alcoholic beverages has been the
standard.8 The Twenty-first Amendment which passed in 1933,
J. D. Candidate, January 2007, The John Marshall
Law School. The
author would like to thank the members of The John Marshall Law Review for
the assistance during the editing process. The author would also like to thank
Thurgood Marshall Jr., Professor Walter J. Kendall, Professor Paul Wangerin,
and Thomas J. Bamonte for their guidance and insight. Finally, the author
wishes to thank his family and friends for their constant support, especially
his wife Jeanne Glunz for her endless patience and encouragement.
1. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
STAFF REPORT,
POSSIBLE
ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE: WINE 7-9 (2003) [hereinafter
FTC REPORT] (explaining that direct shipment means shipping of alcoholic
beverages directly from either a producer or retailer to a consumer outside the
usual system of distribution).
2. See WINE INSTITUTE, DIRECT SHIPMENT LAWS BY STATE FOR WINERIES
(2005), available at http://www.wineinstitute.org/shipwine/ (explaining that
laws governing direct shipment of wine vary from state to state).
3. See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-9.
4. Id.
5. WINE INSTITUTE, supra note 2.
6. 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
8. See RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT:
TEMPERANCE REFORM, LEGAL CULTURE, AND THE POLITY, 1880-1920 19-21
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and in particular, Section Two, granted states wide latitude,9 and
some have argued almost exclusive power,"0 to regulate alcoholic
beverages.
Over the past five decades however, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that the Twenty-first Amendment does not
operate to "trump" other sections of the Constitution and does not
give states unbridled power to regulate alcoholic beverages. 1 As
states begin to come to terms with the Granholm decision,"2 there
are numerous options available that allow them to control the
direct shipments of wine without running afoul of the
Constitution.
Part I of this Comment discusses the history and background
of state regulation of alcoholic beverages. This section will briefly
touch on both the passage of the Twenty-first Amendment and the
early interpretations by the Court as well as more recent decisions
that brought the Twenty-first Amendment in line with the
remainder of the Constitution. Part II of this Comment reviews
the legislative landscape and regulatory schemes of several states
leading up to Granholm and the importance of protecting the
states' interest and the "core concern" of the Twenty-first
Amendment. This section will also discuss the implications of the
Commerce Clause and its relationship with the Twenty-first

(Thomas A. Green & Hendrick Hartog eds., 1995) (explaining the background
leading up to the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment and noting that
advocates of prohibition were primarily focused on reform at the state level
and further stating that "between 1851 and 1855 thirteen states adopted
prohibition").
9. See Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1905 (stating that "the Twenty-first
Amendment grants the states virtually complete control over whether to
permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor
distribution system" (citing California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal
Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980)).
10. See Duncan Baird Douglass, ConstitutionalCrossroads:Reconciling the
Twenty-First Amendment and the Commerce Clause to Evaluate Regulation of
Interstate Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages, 49 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1628 (2000)
(explaining that at one end of the spectrum of how the Twenty-first
Amendment has been interpreted is the plain meaning of the text and, as the
argument goes, that the Twenty-first Amendment grants states an exception
from the rest of the constitution when it comes to regulating alcoholic
beverages).
11. See Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1903 (noting the Court's recent decisions
holding that states' legislative schemes are not per se protected by Section
Two of the Twenty-first amendment whereby they would otherwise violate
another provision of the constitution).
12. The State of New York has already enacted new direct shipment
regulations which were signed into law in July 2005, see N.Y. ALCO. BEv.
CONT. LAW § 79-c-d (McKinney 2005).
Michigan enacted similar new
legislation earlier this year, see MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 436.1203
(LexisNexis 2005).

20071

The Twenty-First Amendment Takes Another Hit

Amendment as well as regulatory efforts underway in both New
York and Michigan following Granholm. Finally, Part III proposes
effective solutions and key components for States that must
rewrite their direct shipping laws highlighting the laws of New
York and Michigan.
I.

THE PENDULUM OF REGULATION SWINGS - FROM THE STATES
AND BACK TO THE STATES

A. The Early Cases
As early as 1847, states began to regulate the importation,
distribution, and sale of alcoholic beverages, and the Supreme
Court held that states had authority to regulate liquor. In The
License Cases,3 the Court upheld the laws of three states and
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island protected the states' right to regulate liquor. The laws in question
required4 licenses to sell liquor and limited the quantity that could
be sold.'
While the decision in The License Cases was perceived as a
victory for the states and for the Prohibition movement, 5 that
victory would not last very long. Following the decision, as States6
continued to struggle to contain the ever-expanding liquor trade,
many states passed laws prohibiting the manufacture,
importation, and sale of liquor. 7 Again, the Supreme Court had to
decide if the Commerce Clause barred States from enforcing these
laws.
In two cases over two years, the Court held the regulatory
laws of Iowa unconstitutional. In the first case, Bowman v.
Chicago & N.W. Railway Co.,'" an Iowa brewer brought suit, not
13. Thurlow v. Massachusetts (The License Cases), 46 U.S. 504 (1847).
14. Id.; see also Brannon P. Denning, Smokey and The Bandit in
Cyberspace: The Dormant Commerce Clause, the Twenty-First Amendment,
and State Regulation of InternetAlcohol Sales, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 297, 300
n.12 (2002) (stating that in The License Cases, "Ithe Court upheld such
regulations, even though they involved some regulation of interstate
commerce"); John Foust, State Power to Regulate Alcohol under the TwentyFirst Amendment: The Constitutional Implications of the Twenty-First
Amendment Enforcement Act, 41 B.C. L. REV. 659, 662 n.22 (2000) (noting that
while there were some differing opinions in the case (six Justices wrote
separate opinions for the three different cases before the Court) the general
idea was that the state laws were constitutional).
15. See HAMM, supra note 8, at 60 (noting that, following the Court's
decision in The License Cases, the prohibition movement had just begun to
take hold, and that, in fact, "the first wave of state prohibition laws swept the
nation").
16. See HAMM, supra note 8, at 62.
17. Id. at 61-63.
18. 125 U.S. 465 (1888).
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against the State of Iowa but against the railroad which refused to
ship the company's products.19 In an apparent change of course
from its decision in The License Cases, the Court struck down the
Iowa law due to "its extraterritoriality and [because] it erected a
barrier to commerce that Congress wished unrestrained."0 The
Court further stated, "It is only after the importation is completed,
and the property imported has mingled with and become a part of
the general property of the State, that [the State's] regulations can
act upon it."2
22
In the second case, Leisy v. Hardin,
an Illinois brewer
brought an action against the State of Iowa after its beer, sold in
its original package, had been confiscated upon shipment into
Iowa." The Iowa law had been passed in response to Bowman,
and made it illegal to sell alcohol produced either in Iowa or
elsewhere.24 Following Bowman, the Court declared the Iowa law
unconstitutional as violating the Commerce Clause, and stated,
"To concede to a state the power to exclude, directly or indirectly,
articles so situated, without congressional permission, is to
concede to a majority of the people of a state ...the power to
regulate commercial intercourse between the states." 5 This, the
Court held, was contrary to the Constitution and was "essential to
that more perfect Union which the Constitution was adopted to

19. Id.; see also HAMM, supra note 8, at 63-64 (explaining the background of
Bowman and noting that the Iowa law the plaintiffs sought to overturn
prohibited shippers from carrying liquor within the State and barred them
from bringing liquor into the State). In Bowman the producer sued the
railroad for not violating the very shipping law in question. Id.
20. Id. at 64; see also Lloyd C. Anderson, Direct Shipment of Wine, the
Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment: A Call for Legislative
Reform, 37 AKRON L. REV. 1, 6 (2004) (noting that the Court in Bowman
determined that its decision in The License Cases was based upon the idea
that a person has the right to import alcohol from another state). "More
importantly, the Court invoked dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence:
Congress' failure to regulate a particular area of interstate commerce
necessarily implies that Congress intended that area to be free of regulation."
Id. Further, Congress had not regulated imports, thus it intended them to be
free from state regulation. Id.
21. Bowman, 125 U.S. at 508.
22. 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
23. Id. at 124-25.
24. See Jonathan W. Garlough, Weighing in on the Wine Wars: What the
European Union Can Teach Us About The Direct Shipment Controversy, 46
WM. AND MARY L. REV. 1533, 1543 (2005) ("The Court ruled [in Leisy that] the
police seizure of Leisy's alcohol invalid, holding that the beer remained an
article of interstate commerce, and thus out of the state's reach as long as it
remained in its original package."); see also Anderson, supra note 20, at 7
(noting that in Leisy, the Court held that liquor in its original and unbroken
packages could not barred from sale by states).
25. Leisy, 135 U.S. at 125.
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create."26
The immediate effect of the Court's rulings was nothing short
of a bonanza for liquor dealers27 and the press reported the spread
of "original package" stores," which helped set off alarm bells
throughout the Prohibition movement." However, many believed
that the Court's opinion was a clear signal to Congress that if it
wanted to authorize the states to regulate in this area, Congress
could do so. 9 In fact, even the brewers' trade association was
upset with the ruling and those that were behind it;31 one of its
directors even accused the prohibitionists of lobbying the Court
and described the ruling as "a blessing to [them] in disguise."32
B. Congress Enters the Fray
The pressure for Congress to act increased after Bowman and
Leisy, and just four months after the Leisy decision,33 Congress
4 The Wilson Act
responded and passed The Wilson Act of 1890."

26. Id.

27. See HAMM, supra note 8, at 69 ("Within a month of the ruling [in Leisy],
'original package houses' and 'Supreme Court saloons' had sprung up in every
prohibition state."); see also Anderson, supra note 20, at 7 (noting that
prohibition states were also at a loss due to the fact that there were no in-state
producers, as it was illegal, and thus these states proved very much to be
highly sought after markets for the importing of alcohol); Garlough, supra note
24, at 1544 (quoting a recent holding by the Seventh Circuit interpreting the
Leisy decision and its effect in Bridenbaughv. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848,
852 (7th Cir. 2000)). The Seventh Circuit ironically held that these decisions
"meant that states could forbid domestic production of alcoholic beverages but
could not stop imports; the Constitution effectively favored out-of-state
sellers." Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 2000).
28. See HAMM, supra note 8, at 73 (describing the time immediately
following the Bowman and Leisy decisions as having "the air of crisis" and
highlighting media accounts which escalated small incidents into the much
feared "original package war" and stating that if no action was taken, warning
of another "battle of states' rights" and a pending "public uprising").
29. See id. at 71 (noting that the prohibitionists were not at all happy with
the decision and "refused to sit idle while 'the liquorites' set up shop. Church
bells were rung to call the citizens together to fight this new menace").
30. See id. at 70 (stating that "those [who were] unhappy with the results of
[Bowman] had only to look at the decision itself to find the means to overturn
it").
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 88.
34. 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2000). The text of the Act states:
All fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids
transported into any State or Territory or remaining therein for use,
consumption, sale or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such State or
Territory be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State
or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers, to the same
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allowed States to regulate the flow of liquor that crossed their
borders regardless of whether it was in its original package,35 thus
closing the so called "Leisy loophole"36 and putting an end to the
original package business." The constitutionality of the Wilson
Act was confirmed by the Court one year after its passage in In re
38
Rahrer.
The decision in Rahrer was seen as a major victory for
the Prohibition movement 9 even though it had not pressed for
passage of the Wilson Act.'
The constitutionality of the Wilson Act was again challenged
in two companion cases, Rhodes v. Iowa" and Vance v. W.A.
While the Wilson Act
Vandercook,3 both decided in 1898.
withstood the frontal assault, its reach was slightly restricted.' 3
extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had
been produced in such State or Territory, and shall not be exempt
therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or
otherwise.
Id.
35. 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2000); see also Anderson, supra note 20, at 8; Denning,
supra note 14, at 301.
36. See Garlough, supra note 24, at 1544.
37. See HAMM, supra note 8, at 88 (citation omitted).
38. 140 U.S. 545 (1891). In this case, Charles Rahrer had been arrested in
Kansas for selling liquor the day after passage of the Wilson Act and sought to
have the Kansas law declared unconstitutional. Id. The Court, in a
unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Fuller, disagreed and upheld the
law and, thereafter, the constitutionality of the Wilson Act. Id. See Anderson,
supra note 20, at 8 (noting the Court's interpretation of the Wilson Act in light
of its very recent decision in Leisy and noting that the Court construed the
Wilson Act as abrogating the decision in Leisy and also noting that the
decision in In re Raher left Bowman unchanged).
39. HAMM, supra note 8, at 90.
40. See id. at 78-79 (noting that the prohibitionists had put their own
agenda ahead of passage of the Wilson Act and in fact, "the author of the bill,
James Wilson, was a regular Republican and no temperance fanatic").
41. 170 U.S. 412 (1898).
42. 170 U.S. 438 (1898).
43. Both of these cases dealt with the direct shipment of alcoholic beverages
for personal use and the Court took a more restrictive view of the Wilson Act.
In Rhodes, an Illinois producer shipped alcoholic beverages to an Iowa
consumer and upon delivery, the goods were thereby confiscated and the State
sought to charge the carrier with violation of its ban on the transportation of
liquor. Rhodes, 170 U.S. at 413-14; see also Anderson, supra note 20, at 9
(noting that the alcohol was purchased in Illinois, a non-prohibition State and
delivered to Iowa, and thus the sale was consummated in Illinois). The court
held that goods did not arrive in the State until they were delivered to the
consignee, and interpreting the Wilson Act to mean that a state's authority did
not attach until after consummating but prior to any further in-state sale, "the
one receiving merchandise of the character named should, whilst retaining the
full right to use the same, no longer enjoy the right to sell free from the
regulations as to sale created by the state." Rhodes, 170 U.S. at 423; see also
Denning, supra note 14, at 302 n.19 (interpreting the holding in Rhodes as
"effectively immunizing from state regulation liquor arriving by interstate
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As a result of a narrower interpretation of the Act and strong
words in Vance," the years following these decisions saw the boom
of the mail-order liquor business."' Again Congress was forced
back into the dispute"6 and, in 1913, over the veto of President
Taft,' 7 passed the Webb-Kenyon Act." The Webb-Kenyon Act
carrier"). Similarly, in Vance, where a South Carolina inspection law was in
question, the Court held that the State could not prohibit the shipment of
liquor for personal use as its foundation was based on the Commerce Clause.
Vance, 170 U.S. at 452-53; see also HAMM, supra note 8, at 177 (citing Vance,
170 U.S. 455) (stating that the "right of every citizen of another state to avail
himself of interstate commerce" could not be controlled by the State inspection
regulations).
44. See Foust, supra note 14, at 663 (stating that in the majority opinion in
Vance, "the Court even stated that 'the right of persons in one State to ship
liquor into another State to a resident for his own use is derived from the
Constitution of the United States'").
45. See HAMM, supra note 8, at 178 (stating that in the years following the
Court's decisions, "Shippers, liberated from state hindrance by the Rhodes and
Vance rulings deluged the prohibition states with intoxicating beverages").
46. See Foust, supra note 14, at 663 (noting that groups such as the
Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) and the Anti-Saloon League
pressed Congress to act to ebb the flow of liquor through the direct shipment
loophole opened up by the Court's holding in Rhodes and Vance); see also
Anderson, supra note 20, at 9-10 (explaining further the role that both the
WCTU and especially the Anti-Saloon League had on the prohibition
movement during this time and their role in Congress' passage of the WebbKenyon Act).
47. See Foust, supra note 14, at 664 (taking note that President Taft had
vetoed the bill due to his belief that it violated the Constitution); see also
Granholm, 125 S.Ct at 1900 (noting that President Taft was acting under the
advise of Attorney General Wickersham); Foust supra note 14, at 664 n.32,
(making mention of the fact that Taft, who later would serve as Chief Justice
of the Court, never had the opportunity to rule on the interstate commerce
implications of state regulation of alcohol due to passage of the *Eighteenth
Amendment).
48. 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2000). The text of the Act states:
The shipment or transportation, in any manner or by any means
whatsoever, of any spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, or other
intoxicating liquor of any kind, from one State, Territory, or District of
the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, into any other State, Territory, or District of the
United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, or from any foreign country into any State, Territory, or District
of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, which said spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, or
other intoxicating liquor is intended, by any person interested therein,
to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used, either in the
original package or otherwise, in violation of any law of such State,
Territory, or District of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, is prohibited.
Id.; see Foust, supra note 14, at 663-64 (noting that the original title of the
Webb-Kenyon Act was "an Act divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate
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essentially closed the mail-order, direct sale loophole. Four years
later, the Court upheld the Webb-Kenyon Act in Clark Distilling
Co. v. Western MarylandRailway.49
In December 1917, Congress passed the resolution for the
ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment.w° By January 1918,
national prohibition had officially become part of the
constitutional landscape;5 1 one year later it became the law of the
land. 2
C. Ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment and Early
Interpretations
The era of national prohibition proved to be short lived.
After the election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Congress
passed and the states ratified the Twenty-first Amendment, and
by December 1933 the Amendment became effective.' Although
Section One of the Amendment has received more widespread
acknowledgement
due to its repeal of the Eighteenth
Amendment,' it is the lesser known Section Two that has caused
the most uncertainty in the courts.'
character in certain cases").
49. 242 U.S. 311 (1915). In Clark Distilling, the Court upheld the WebbKenyon Act against a challenge from a Maryland liquor producer seeking an
injunction against enforcement of a West Virginia statute prohibiting the sale
of liquor. Id.; see Anderson, supra note 20, at 10-11 ("Congress has power to
prohibit all shipment of alcohol, and that all-encompassing power includes the
lesser power to permit some prohibition, by those states that choose to do so,"
and thus, through the Webb-Kenyon Act, Congress abrogated the decision in
Rhodes); see also Foust, supra note 14, at 678 (noting that with the holding in
Clark Distilling, the Webb-Kenyon Act took the transportation and
importation of liquor out of the reach of the Commerce Clause).
50. See HAMM, supra note 8, at 245-47.
51. See id. at 247 (noting the debates and the drafting of the Amendment in
Congress and the speed with which the Amendment was ratified by the states:
"Drys overcame the wets with superior organization, preparation and
generalship.., ratification 'came with a speed and an avalanche like
irresistibility' that surprised both wets and drys"). A mere month after the
Amendment was sent to the states for ratification, on January 16, 1918,
"Nebraska became the thirty-sixth state to ratify." Id.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
Under Section One of the Amendment, national prohibition did not become
effective until one year following ratification, thus when Nebraska ratified on
January 16, 1918, the effective date of the Amendment was not until January
16, 1919. Id. § 1.
53. See Foust, supra note 14, at 665 (noting that during his campaign for
the presidency, Franklin Roosevelt's platform advocated the repeal of
prohibition).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1, which reads: "The eighteenth article of
amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed."
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2, which reads: "The transportation or
importation into any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States for
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While there has been much debate and some confusion about
the meaning and purpose of Section Two,5 many scholars hold
that it was an extension of Webb-Kenyon.57 Regardless, as the
Court pointed out in Granholm, "[There exists] strong support for
the view that § 2 restored to the States the powers they had under
the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts.""8
Soon after ratification, as states began to develop
mechanisms to regulate liquor, the Supreme Court was called
upon to determine the parameters of the states' authority under
the Twenty-first Amendment. One of the first opportunities came
in State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co.59 In Young's
Market, beer wholesalers challenged the State's regulation
imposing an import fee as violating the Commerce Clause." In
upholding the regulation, the unanimous Court acknowledged that
prior to the Twenty-first Amendment the law would have been
void. 1 However, after citing the text of Section Two of the
delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof,
is hereby prohibited." See also Douglass, supra note 10, at 1620 (noting that
without Section Two, the Amendment would have returned liquor to its
'unfettered status" in the pre-prohibition era).
56. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97, 107 n.10 (1980) (pointing out that the source of some of the
confusion is the statements of the framers of the Amendment themselves).
The Senate sponsor of the Amendment, Senator Blaine, "said the purpose of
§ 2 was to restore to the States... absolute control in effect over interstate
commerce affecting intoxicating liquors ....

[H]e also made statements...

that § 2 was designed only to ensure that 'dry' States could not be forced by
the Federal Government to permit the sale of liquor." Id. (citing 6 Cong. Rec.
S4143 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine)); see also Bacchus Imports v. Dias,
468 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1984) (recognizing the obscure legislative history of
Section Two and noting various interpretations apparently espoused by
Senator Blaine himself).
57. See Anderson, supra note 20, at 13 ("Section Two of the Twenty-first
Amendment constitutionalized the Webb-Kenyon Act."); see also Foust, supra
note 14, at 678 (citing GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN SULLIVAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 346 n.1 (13th ed. 1997)) (noting that the substance of
the Webb-Kenyon Act became part of the text of the Twenty-first
Amendment).
58. Granholm, 125 S. Ct at 1902. See generally Aaron Nielson, Recent
Development: No More 'Cherry-Picking the Real History of the 21st
Amendment's § 2, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 281 (2004) (discussing more in
depth the debates in both Congress and the state conventions leading up to
the authorization and ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment).
59. 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
60. Id. at 60-61.
61. Id. at 62. The Court stated:
Prior to the Twenty-first Amendment, it would obliviously have been
unconstitutional to have imposed any fee for [the] privilege [of importing
beer from a sister State]. The imposition would have been void, not
because it resulted in discrimination, but because the fee would be a
direct burden on interstate commerce.
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Amendment, the Court held that the "words used are apt to confer
upon the State the power to forbid all importations which do not
comply" with the regulation."
The Court was thus espousing, based on the text,' a broad
view of the effect of the Twenty-first Amendment,' and held that
it saved the law in question from a Commerce Clause challenge.'
Two other cases came before the Court with similar challenges
and, in both cases, the Court applied Young's Market to uphold
state laws on grounds that the Twenty-first Amendment saved the
regulations from Equal Protection and Commerce Clause
challenges.6

Id.
62. Id. The Court further described the Amendment as a "broad command"
and stated:
The plaintiffs ask us to limit this broad command. They request us to
construe the Amendment as saying, in effect: The state may prohibit the
importation of intoxicating liquors provided it prohibits the manufacture
and sale within its boarders; but if it permits such manufacture and
sale, it must let imported liquors compete with the domestic on equal
terms. To say that, would involve not a construction of the Amendment,
but a rewriting of it.

Id.
63. See Foust, supra note 14, at 679-80 (describing the Court's approach in
Young's Market as the textual approach).
64. See also Douglass, supra note 10, at 1637-38 (describing the Twentyfirst Amendment as creating a "complete Commerce Clause carve out" for
states in the regulation of liquor); Ralph Wiser & Richard Arledge, Does the
Repeal Amendment Empower a State to Erect Tariff Barriers and Disregard
the Equal ProtectionClause in Legislatingon IntoxicatingLiquors in Interstate
Commerce?, 7 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 402, 403 (1939) ("[Tlhe decision [in Young's
Market] appears broad enough to serve as a guide to state legislatures desiring
to enact legislation designed to discriminate against intoxicating liquors
produced beyond the borders of the state and to favor home industry in this
field.").
65. See Vijay Shanker, Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws, the Commerce
Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment, 85 VA. L. REV. 353, 370 (1999)
(observing that the Youngs Market court construed the Twenty-first
Amendment as an exception to the Commerce Clause).
66. See Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938) (upholding,
unanimously, a Minnesota law in a suit alleging that the law, barring the
importation of liquor containing more then twenty-five percent alcohol,
violated the Equal Protection Clause). While the Court acknowledged that the
law "clearly discriminates in favor of liquor processed within the State," it held
that based on the decision in Young's Market, the law is settled, and the
Twenty-first Amendment allows such regulation.
Id. at 403; see also
Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n., 305 U.S. 391 (1939)
(upholding an equally discriminatory Michigan law which barred the sale of
beer from any state that similarly discriminated against beer manufactured in
Michigan).
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D. Modern Twenty-First Amendment Jurisprudence
Following Young's Market, it would be reasonable to assume
that the Twenty-first Amendment would also save state
regulations from other provisions of the Constitution. However,
beginning in 1964 with Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam
Distilling Co., 7 a case arising from a conflict between the Twentyfirst Amendment and the Export-Import Clause,' the Court began
to harmonize the Twenty-first Amendment with the rest of the
Constitution.
The suggestion that the Twenty-first Amendment does not
save every law adopted by the states in the regulation of liquor
was also at issue in Wisconsin v. Constantineau.69 That case
involved a procedural due process challenge to a statute that
allowed public notice to forbid the sale of liquor to an individual
who "by excessive drinking produce[s] described conditions or
exhibits specified traits."" The Court struck down the statute as it
violated procedural due process and held that it was not saved by
the Twenty-first Amendment.7'
2
Similarly, in Craig v. Boren,"
male plaintiffs and a liquor
vendor sought an injunction against an Oklahoma statute that
barred the sale of 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of
twenty-two and females under the age of eighteen." Voiding the
statute on Equal Protection grounds, the court stated, "The
Twenty-first Amendment does not save the invidious gender-based
discrimination from invalidation as a denial of equal protection of
the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."74 The Court
has also applied this rule in cases dealing with the First
Amendment75 and the Establishment Clause.6
67. 377 U.S. 341 (1964) (holding that a Kentucky statute which imposed a
tax on whiskey imported from Scotland was not valid due to the Export-Import
Clause of the Constitution and was not saved by the Twenty-first
Amendment). "To sustain the tax... would require nothing short of squarely
holding that the Twenty-first Amendment has completely repealed the ExportImport Clause so far as intoxicants are concerned. Nothing in the language of
the Amendment nor in its history leads to such an extraordinary conclusion."
Id. at 345-46.
68. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. ("No State shall, without the
consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports,
except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws.").
69. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
70. Id. at 434 (internal quotation omitted).
71. Id. at 435-36.
72. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
73. Id. at 192.
74. Id. at 204-05.
75. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (holding

that Rhode Island's ban on advertising of liquor pricing which violated the
First Amendment is not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment).
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL HIERARCHY -

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
LEAPS AHEAD OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT

A. The Three-Tier System
Shortly after ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment,
states began to create regulatory mechanisms to control the liquor
industry. The most common of these schemes," which is still in
effect today,7 8 is the so-called "three-tier system." Under this
system, alcoholic beverages must pass from a producer to a
wholesaler; from a wholesaler to a retailer; and from a retailer to
the consumer. 79
The three-tier system has withstood challenge,' and
continues to be the key regulatory system among the states.8'
That said, the current direct shipment debate is the toughest
challenge to the three-tier system." Still, based on the Court's
recent statements in Granholm,' the three-tier system has, at a
76. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (holding that a
Massachusetts' regulation that violated the Establishment Clause is not saved
as a valid exercise of the state's authority under the Twenty-first
Amendment).
77. See Shanker, supra note 65, at 355-56 (noting that most states adopted
the three-tier system after prohibition and that the system sought to end the
pre-prohibition arrangement of producers also acting as retailers).
78. See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-6 (noting that most wine today is
sold through the three-tier system).
79. See id. (explaining how the three-tier system works, the interaction of
state and federal regulations within the system, and that its purpose was to
collect taxes and keep liquor out of the hands of minors); see also Susan Lorde
Martin, Changing the Law: Update from the Wine War, 17 J.L. & POL. 63-64
(2001) (noting that the purpose of the system was to ensure that organized
crime would be kept out of the liquor business and that the system would
promote temperance).
80. See Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989) (holding invalid a
Connecticut statute mandating price affirmations); North Dakota v. United
States, 495 U.S. 423, 466 (1990) (noting that the state regulatory scheme could
require liquor to pass through the three-tier system).
81. See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-6.
82. See Transcript of Oral Arguments at 4-6, 14, Granholm, 125 S. Ct. 1885
(2005) (Nos. 03-1116, 03-1120, 03-1274) (discussing the three-tier system in
light of direct shipment). Throughout the oral arguments the issue was raised
by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg and Stevens as to whether the holding in the
case could apply to out of state distributors. See also Shanker, supra note 65,
at 361-63 (explaining that the interests at stake as being wholesalers,
distributors and retailers on one side and small wineries and consumers on
the other).
83. See Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1892 (noting that the Court has held that
under the Twenty-first Amendment, states can require liquor to pass through
the three-tier system). It appears that in the Court's decision in Granholm the
Court went out of its way to affirm the legitimacy of the three-tier system
when it stated:
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minimum, survived, but more probably, the system has once again
received the Court's approval.' It is important to note that states
have a critical interest in seeing the three-tier system survive.
The key interests at stake for the states are preventing minors
from obtaining alcohol, maintaining orderly markets to prevent
unlawful diversion of alcohol, and raising revenue through
taxation ."
B.

The Twenty-FirstAmendment Versus the Commerce Clause

As discussed above, the modern Twenty-first Amendment
cases brought the Amendment in line with the remainder of the
Constitution. As the decisions in Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias86
7 illustrate, the Twenty-first Amendment will not
and Granholm"
save a state regulation that would otherwise violate the
discrimination principle of the Commerce Clause.
Beginning in 1964, with the decision in Hostetter v. Idlewild
Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.,' the Court began to chip away at the
states' unfettered right to regulate interstate liquor distribution
under the Twenty-first Amendment,89 and began to move away
from the Young's Market line of cases."
In Hostetter, a liquor
The States argue that any decision invalidating their direct-shipment
laws would call into question the constitutionality of the three-tier
system. This does not follow from our holding. "The Twenty-first
Amendment grants the States virtually complete control over whether
to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor
distribution system".... We have previously recognized that the threetier system itself is 'unquestionably legitimate.'
Id. at 1905-06 (citations omitted).
84. Id.; see also Press Release, Statement of David K. Rehr, President of the
National Beer Wholesalers Association (May, 2005), available at
httpJ/www.nbwa.org/publicnews room/press releases/pr_05 16 05.aspx;
Press Release, Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of America, Inc., Supreme Court
Upholds States' Broad Authority to Regulate Alcohol (May 16, 2005), available
at http'//www.wswa.org/public/media/20050516.html
(highlighting the
Granholm decision as an affirmation that the three-tier system is legitimate).
85. See Anderson, supra note 20, at 37-38 (explaining that the key interests
for the states are closely related to the central concern of § 2 of the Twentyfirst Amendment).
86. Bacchus, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
87. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. 1885.
88. 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
89. See also Shanker, supra note 65, at 372 (explaining that Young's Market
was the dominant theory of how the Twenty-first Amendment was to be
interpreted for over twenty years and that Hostetter was the "key case"
indicating the there may be some limits to the States' power to regulate
intoxicating liquor).
90. See Anderson, supra note 20, at 14-15 (noting the Court's move away
from the "sweeping dictum" in the case of IndianapolisBrewing Co. v. Liquor
Control Commission, 305 U.S. 391 (1939), which followed the decision in
Young's Market). In Indianapolis Brewing, an Indiana brewer brought suit
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dealer operating at an international airport sold liquor to
departing international travelers for delivery at their foreign
destination. 9' After being notified by the state liquor authority
that its operations were illegal, the dealer sought an injunction
against enforcement.n
The issue before the Court was "whether the Twenty-first
Amendment so far obliterates the Commerce Clause"' as to allow
New York to bar that which was regulated by a federal agency
acting under expressed federal law.' The Court rejected the view
that the Twenty-first Amendment acted in such a fashion and
described this approach as an "absurd oversimplification" of the
Amendment.' The Court also said that "if the Commerce Clause
had been pro tanto 'repealed'... Congress would [have] no
regulatory power over interstate or foreign commerce in
intoxicating liquor."'
The Court described this conclusion as
"patently bizarre" and "demonstrably incorrect."97 Instead, the
Court proposed that both the Twenty-first Amendment and the
Commerce Clause "must be considered in the light of the other,
and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any
concrete case."'
The Court relied upon this framework" sixteen years later in
seeking to enjoin enforcement of a Michigan statute which prohibited
Michigan vendors from selling products of any state, Indiana being one of
them, which it deemed discriminating against Michigan products.
IndianapolisBrewing, 305 U.S. at 392. In upholding the statute, the Court
stated, "For whatever its character, the law is valid. Since the Twenty-first
Amendment, as held in [Young's Market], the right of a state to prohibit or
regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not limited by the Commerce
Clause. ... " Id. at 394; see also Wiser & Arledge, supra note 64, at 409
(stating that, following the decision in Young's Market, "It is now not without
the realm of possibility that we may see one state sending ambassadors into
other states seeking to barter trade treaties in respect to intoxicating liquor").
91. Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 324-25.
92. Id. at 327.
93. Id. at 329.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 331-32.
96. Id. at 332.
97. Id.; see also Denning, supra note 14, at 318 (noting that the way in
which Justice Stewart framed the issue - (i) by discussing it not as an issue
of importation but as through-shipment, (ii) applying preemption doctrine, and
(iii) through the involvement of a federal agency, treating the airport as
analogous to a federal enclave - enabled him to avoid following Young's
Market).
98. Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 332; see also Douglass, supra note 10, at 1638
(noting that the Hostetter decision was the first indication from the Court that
the Commerce Clause could effectively be used to challenge state regulation of
liquor).
99. See Russ Miller, The Wine is in the Mail: The Twenty-first Amendment
and State Laws Against the Direct Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages, 54 VAND.
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CaliforniaRetail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc."w
In that case, the Court struck down a California statute as
violating the Sherman Act, and the Court held that the Twentyfirst Amendment did not save the statute. 1' The Court relied
upon the framework four years later in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v.
Crisp'° when the court framed the issue as whether the interests
behind the state regulation are "so closely related to the powers
reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment" that they are allowed to
trump "express federal policies. " "° The unanimous Court struck
down the Oklahoma regulation holding that federal law preempted
the state regulation."'
While neither Midcal nor Capital Cities dealt directly with
L. REV. 2495, 2523-24 (2001) (suggesting that while the Court has not
established a bright line test, there is a framework following Midcal, Capital
Cities, and Bacchus which helps analyze Twenty-first Amendment
jurisprudence). This framework was also used by Garlough, supra note 24, at
1549, which was described as a "two-pronged test."
100. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). In this case, a wine wholesaler sought an injunction
against enforcement of a California wine pricing statute, claiming that it
violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 100. The wholesaler was successful in the
State courts and an appeal was brought, not by the State, but by the
California Retail Liquor Dealers Association, an intervener. Id. at 101-02.
The Association argued that even if the statute "is not protected state action,
the Twenty-first Amendment bars application of the Sherman Act." Id. at 106.
The Court disagreed, and struck down the statute, holding that the Twentyfirst Amendment "provides no shelter for the violation of the Sherman Act."
Id. at 114. More importantly for the discussion here, the Court relied upon
Justice Stewart's opinion in Hostetter, describing it as a "pragmatic effort to
harmonize state and federal powers." Id. at 109. The Court went on to say
that, "[a]lthough States retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor
regulations, those controls may be subject to the federal commerce power in
appropriate situations. The competing state and federal interests can be
reconciled only after careful scrutiny of those concerns in a 'concrete case.'" Id.
at 110.
101. Id. at 114.
102. 467 U.S. 691 (1984). In this case, a group of cable television operators
brought suit seeking an injunction against enforcement of an Oklahoma
statute, which required the operators to delete advertisements for alcoholic
beverages in the retransmission of out-of-state signals. Id. at 694-96. The
conflict presented here was between a state statute and a federal policy
expressed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which required
cable operators to retransmit signals located in neighboring states. Id. at 712.
In a unanimous opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan described the ban as a
"modest" and "selective approach," and explained that the ban in question was
not a complete advertising ban and was only directed at "wine commercials
that occasionally appear in out-of-state signals." Id. at 715. In striking down
the statute, the Court used a balancing test and held that when "the State's
central power under the Twenty-first Amendment of regulating the times,
places, and manner under which liquor may be imported and sold is not
directly implicated" the balance favors the federal law. Id. at 716.
103. Id. at 714.
104. Id. at 716.
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Commerce Clause challenges, they relied upon and solidified
Justice Stewart's holding in Hostetter.1' These three cases Hostetter, Midcal, and Capital Cities - together, stand for the
proposition that when there are conflicting state and federal
regulations regarding regulation of intoxicating liquor, each must
be looked at and harmonized in light of each other."
In the same month that it ruled in Capital Cities, the Court
again relied upon Hostetter, this time in a Commerce Clause
challenge, in the seminal case of Bacchus."7 Here, several liquor
wholesalers challenged a Hawaii excise tax on liquor, specifically
the provision in that statute that exempted certain domestically
produced liquor from the twenty percent tax." Basing its holding
primarily on the three decisions discussed immediately above, the
Court struck down the tax and analyzed the case through a twostep process."
First, the Court sought to determine if the
challenged act did in fact discriminate against interstate
commerce." 0 If it did, the second step called on the Court to decide
whether the act, which would otherwise offend the Commerce
Clause, could be saved by the Twenty-first Amendment.'
As to step one, the Court began its discussion by pointing out
the basic rule under Commerce Clause jurisprudence"' that a
state may not "impose a tax which discriminates against interstate
commerce... by providing a direct commercial advantage to local
business."..
The Court went on to point out it was undisputed
that the purpose of the act here was to favor local industry,"4
which the Court described as "economic protectionism.""' The
Court thus held that the tax exemption did in fact violate the
Commerce Clause as it discriminated in favor of domestic
industry."'

105. Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 332.
106. Capital Cities, 467 U.S. at 714.
107. 468 U.S. 263.
108. Id. at 265. The plaintiffs also brought challenges based upon the Equal
Protection Clause and the Export-Import Clause. Id. at 276 n.11. The Court
however did not address these claims due to its disposition of the Commerce
Clause. Id.
109. See Garlough, supra note 24, at 1549 (discussing the two-pronged test
used by the Supreme Court since its decision in Hostetter); see also supra note
99.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. The Court described the federal interest behind the Commerce Clause
as "preventing economic Balkanization." Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 276.
113. Id. at 268 (citing Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S.
318, 329 (1977)).
114. Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 271.
115. Id. at 272.
116. Id. at 273. The Court held that while one or the other would have been

20071

The Twenty-First Amendment Takes Another Hit

As to the second step, determining whether the Twenty-first
Amendment saves the challenged act, the Court rejected the
State's argument 17 and held that the Amendment did not save the
tax."'
The Court stated that, "[t]he central purpose of the
[Twenty-first Amendment] was not to empower States to favor
local liquor industries by erecting barriers to competition."" 9
Taking it one step further, the Court went on to say that "[sitate
laws that constitute mere economic protectionism are therefore not
entitled to the same deference as laws enacted to combat the
perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in liquor.""'
Along similar lines, in Granholm,"' the Court recently
returned to the issue of state regulation of intoxicating liquor and
the conflict between the Twenty-first Amendment and the
Commerce Clause. Granholm is a consolidation of two similar
cases, one from the Sixth Circuit"' and one from the Second
Circuit,"' the holdings of which are in direct conflict. Four other
United States Courts of Appeals decided similar direct-shipment
sufficient to violate the Commerce Clause, the act in question "had both the
purpose and effect of discriminating in favor of local products." Id. (emphasis
added).
117. The Court took notice of the fact that the State did not use the Twentyfirst Amendment in the State courts below. Id. at 274 n.12. In fact, "the State
expressly disclaimed any reliance upon [it] in the court below and did not cite
it in its motion to dismiss or affirm." Id.
118. Id. at 275-76.
119. Id. at 276.
120. Id. (emphasis added). The Court further noted that the State solely
defended the tax on the claim that it promoted local industry and made no
attempt to defend it on the basis that it would promote temperance "or any
other purpose of the Twenty-first Amendment." Id.; see also Shanker, supra
note 65, at 373-74 (noting that the reasoning of Bacchus and Capital Cities
was also relied on by the Court in two other decisions: Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986), and
Healy, 491 U.S. 324 (1989), to invalidate price affirmation statutes which
required out-of-state liquor dealers to post their pricing and affirm that the
prices in the state were no higher then those in others states).
121. 125 S. Ct. 1885.
122. Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003). This case was an appeal
from the district court which the plaintiffs, Michigan consumers and an out-ofstate winery, brought against the State of Michigan arguing that the State's
liquor laws violated the Commerce Clause. Id. at 519. On cross-motions for
summary judgment, the district court upheld the regulation and granted
summary judgment for the defendants. Id. at 520. The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit reversed and struck down the regulation as violating the
Commerce Clause. Id. at 527-28.
123. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004). This was an appeal
by the defendant, State of New York, from a decision granting summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, New York consumers and two out-of-state
wineries. Id. at 229-30. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed
and held that the regulation was valid under the Twenty-first Amendment.
Id. at 239.
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cases, among them the Fourth,14 Fifth, 2' Seventh, 2 ' and
Eleventh 7 Circuits. Only the Second and Seventh Circuits have
upheld a ban on the direct-shipment of wine in the face of a
Commerce Clause challenge.'
It is clear from the outset of the Court's opinion in Granholm
that neither Michigan, nor New York's regulation would withstand
the Court's scrutiny.
The Court began its discussion by
reviewing the current landscape of direct-shipment laws among
the states,' 13 as well as the economic impact' of direct-shipments
of wine. 32 The Court took note of the current trends in the wine
124.
125.
126.
127.

Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003).
Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003).
Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000).
Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002).

128. For an in-depth review of the separate federal district and circuit court
decisions, see generally Anderson, supra note 20, at 21-30, Martin, supra note
79, at 66-81, and Garlough, supra note 24, at 1550-57.
129. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1892. In the opening paragraph of a rather
lengthy opinion, prior to any introduction of the parties or discussion of the
issues, Justice Kennedy stated, "It is evident that the object and design of the
Michigan and New York statutes is to grant in-state wineries a competitive
advantage over wineries located beyond the State's borders." Id.
130. Id. at 1892-93; see also FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-4 (discussing
state bans on interstate direct shipping); WINE INSTITUTE, supra note 2
(discussing general state regulations on wine).
131. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1893. Justice Kennedy quoted the FTC Report,
stating that, "[sitate bans on interstate direct shipping represent the single
largest regulatory barrier to expanded e-commerce in wine." Id. (quoting FTC
REPORT, supra note 1, at 3).
132. As an example of the current landscape, the opinion discusses the
situation of one of the plaintiffs in the Michigan case, Domaine Alfred. Id.
Domaine Alfred is a small California winery with annual production of three
thousand cases. Id. The Court states that the winery cannot fulfill its orders
from Michigan due to the ban on direct shipment and that the "wholesaler's
markup would render shipment through the three-tier system economically
infeasible." Id. The emphasis here appears to be misplaced. Reading only the
Court's opinion, one might be left with the impression that the success or
failure of Domaine Alfred depended solely on its tight profit margins. Such
may not entirely be the case. A cursory view of the winery's website,
http'//www.domainealfred.com /purchase.html, shows that the price for a
regular size bottle (750 ML) is between eighteen and ninety dollars, with a
minimum order of six bottles required per shipment. It is also worth noting
that the owner of Domaine Alfred, "made close to a gazillion dollars" before
retiring from work in the Silicon Valley. Anne Schamberg, Grape 'Farmer'
Learning Craft from the Ground Up, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL JSONLINE, Jan. 17, 2004, http://www.jsonline.com/entree/col/jan04/200140.asp
(last visited Oct. 30, 2005). Finally, this author's family has been in the
wholesale wine and beer business in Illinois for over one hundred and fifteen
years and currently represents at least ten American wineries with production
at or lower then three thousand cases; for a list, see Louis Glunz Wines, Inc.,
Our Wines, http'/www.louisglunzwines.com/page3.html (last visited Jan. 10,
2006).
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industry, which has experienced a consolidation in the wholesale
business and a dramatic expansion in wineries.'33 The Court then
explained that the issue before it was whether the states'
regulations, which prohibited out-of-state wineries from shipping
directly to consumers but allowed in-state wineries to do so,
"violates the dormant Commerce Clause in light of § 2 of the
Twenty-first Amendment." 34
Using the analytical framework it utilized in Bacchus, the
Court first determined whether the regulations in question
violated the Commerce Clause. Explaining the nondiscrimination
principle in traditional Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court
stated that, state regulations "violate the Commerce Clause if they
mandate 'differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state
economic interests'. . . . This rule is essential to the foundations of
the Union ...the mere fact of nonresidence should not foreclose a
producer in one State from access to markets in other States."'35
In determining whether the regulations discriminated against
out-of-state interests, the Court first looked at the Michigan
statute and stated that "the discriminatory character of the
3
Michigan system is obvious.""
The Court noted that the
regulation required only out-of-state products to pass through the
three-tier system, while in-state wineries could ship directly to
consumers.'37 The Court held this to be unlawful differential
treatment.
The challenged New York regulation, on the other hand, did
not completely prohibit the direct shipment of wine to
consumers. 39 Instead, New York required that for out-of-state
producers to ship directly, they must first establish a physical
presence within the state. " This physical presence requirement,'

133. Granholm, 125 S. Ct at 1895.
134. Id. In framing the issue, the Court directly used the framework in
Justice Stewart's holding in Hostetter, that each be considered in light of the
other. Id. at 487.
135. Id. at 1895 (citing Oregon Waste System, Inc. v. Department of
Environmental Quality of Ore., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994), and H.P. Hood & Sons,
Inc. v. Du Mond., 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949)).
136. Granholm, 125 S.Ct. at 1896.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. The Court describes this scheme as another way of forcing out-of

state producers into the three-tier system. Id. The Court also noted that
while this option was available for out-of-state producers to establish a
presence in the state in order to ship directly, "there is some confusion of the
precise steps... in part because no winery has run the State's regulatory
gauntlet." Id.
141. It is worth mentioning that in Swedenburg, the Second Circuit noted
that a physical presence requirement was problematic, but nevertheless
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the Court held, is "contrary to our admonition that States cannot
require an out-of-state firm 'to become a resident in order to
compete on equal terms."'"
The Court also held that the
43
preferential terms of the licenses given to in-state wineries'
under the New York statute discriminated against interstate
commerce. 1

The Court turned to the states' contention that their laws
were saved by Section Two of the Twenty-first Amendment. In its
discussion, the Court first outlined the history of the regulation of
intoxicating liquor, much of which has been explained in Part I
above, including the Wilson 145 and Webb-Kenyon Acts.4 The Court
then looked at the modern Section Two decisions, placing them
into three categories: first, those where the Court held that state
laws violated another portion of the Constitution and were not
saved by Section Two; 147 second, those that "held that [Section
Two] does not abrogate Congress' Commerce Clause powers; " l'
and finally, those that "held that state regulation of alcohol is
limited by the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce
Clause." 5 Refusing to overturn Bacchus,"' the Court held that
Section Two does not save the New York and Michigan statutes
and stated, "State policies are protected under the Twenty-first
Amendment when they treat liquor produced out of state the same

upheld the regulation. 358 F.3d at 238.
142. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1897 (citing Halliburton Oil Well Cementing
Co. v. Reily, 737 U.S. 64, 72 (1963)).
143. Id. at 1897.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1898-99. In its discussion on The Wilson Act, the Court stated
that, "By its own terms, the Wilson Act did not allow States to discriminate
against out-of-state liquor." Id. at 1899. The Court went on, quoting its prior
decision in Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897), and stated "the Wilson Act was
'not intended to confer upon any State the power to discriminate...' the
Wilson act mandated 'equality or uniformity of treatment under state laws.'"
Id. The Court finally mentioned that the Wilson Act "remains in effect today."
Id. at 1901.
146. The Court also explained that contrary to Michigan and New York's
suggestion, Webb-Kenyon did not withdraw the Wilson Act's bar on
discrimination and did not "repeal the Wilson Act, which expressly precludes
States from discriminating." Id.
147. Id. at 1903, citing the decisions in this category: 44 Liquormart, 517
U.S. 484; Larkin, 459 U.S. 116; Craig, 429 U.S. 190; Constantineau,400 U.S.
433; and, Dep't. of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341
(1964).
148. Id. at 1903-04. Here the Court examined Capital Cities, Midcal, and
Hostetter.
149. See id. at 1904 (discussing in depth, the holding in Bacchus).
150. See id. (mentioning that the States propose overturning or limiting
Bacchus and retorting, "we decline their invitation").
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as its domestic equivalent."15'
In striking the final blow to the States' regulations, the
Granholm Court, in essence, applied a strict scrutiny test under
traditional Commerce Clause jurisprudence.' 2 After holding that
the regulations violated the nondiscrimination principle of the
Commerce Clause and determining that they are not saved by
Section Two, the Court stated that it must still determine whether
the legislation "advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be
adequately
served
by
reasonable
nondiscriminatory
alternatives." 3 The States' justification for restricting out-of-state
shipments from wineries was that the regulations would keep
alcohol away from minors as well as provide a vehicle for efficient
tax collection.'
The Court, in striking down both statutes,"' held
that these arguments "have not satisfied this exacting standard."M
C. ReciprocalStates
Currently, only seven states are considered reciprocal states
in terms of their direct-shipment laws."7 While some may believe
that Granholm will have little effect on these laws, they should be
aware of the strong dictum in Justice Kennedy's opinion for the
Court, and this is especially true for state legislatures that must
rewrite their liquor laws."
In laying out the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
Kennedy points out that "states should not be compelled to
negotiate with each other regarding favored or disfavored
status .... States do not need, and may not attempt, to negotiate
with other States regarding their mutual economic interests.""9
Justice Kennedy went further to add that the "perceived necessity
for reciprocal sale privileges risks generating the trade rivalries
and animosities ... that the Constitution and, in particular, the

151. Id. at 1905.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. The Court affirmed the decision of the Sixth Circuit and reversed and
remanded the decision of the Second Circuit. Id. at 1907.
156. Id.
157. See WINE INSTITUTE, supra note 2 (follow "State Shipping Laws"
hyperlink) (indicating that Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin are reciprocal States).
158. The State of California changed its law following the decision in
Granholm. The California Legislature passed S.B. 118. Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger signed it into law on August 31, 2005, and it became effective
January 1, 2006. California now requires direct shippers to have a license,
pay taxes, and verify proper age in order to ship into the State. Cal. S.B. 118,
2005 Reg. Sess. (Deering 2005).
159. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1895.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[40:651

Commerce Clause were designed to avoid.""6 Finally, it should be
noted that the final test the Court applied in striking down the
laws in Granholm, as explained above, came directly from New
Energy Company of Indiana v. Limbach,'61 where the unanimous
Court declared an Ohio reciprocity law unconstitutional.16
D. New York and Michigan Legislative Revisions
As Granholm makes clear, if a state allows the direct
shipment of wine, it may not discriminate between in-state and
out-of-state producers." According to the Court, states are free to
decide whether or not to prohibit direct shipment altogether, but
in-state and out-of-state interests must be treated the same." In
the last year, both New York and Michigan amended their laws to
comply with the Court's holding.
In New York, the legislature passed a bill"M which Governor
George Pataki signed into law that allows for the direct shipment
of wine to consumers." New York is now a reciprocal State and
its residents can receive wine shipped from a state that affords
New York wineries the same privilege.'67 More importantly for
New York wineries," the new law makes it possible for them to
ship to other reciprocal states as well as those states with no ban
at all.' 69

160. Id. at 1896.
161. 486 U.S. 269 (1988). In this case an energy company based in Indiana

sought an injunction to bar enforcement of an Ohio statute which granted a
tax credit for ethanol, but only if the ethanol was either produced within Ohio
or in a state which granted Ohio produced ethanol the same advantage. Id. at
272. The Court declared the Ohio law unconstitutional under dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Id. at 273-74.
162. Id. at 280.
163. Granholm, 125 S. Ct at 1907.
164. Id.
165. N.Y.S.B. 5731, 2005 Reg. Sess. (McKinney 2005). It is worth noting
that the original sponsor of the legislation, State Senator George Winner,

represents the Finger Lakes region in New York, which is one of the largest
wine producing areas in New York.
166. N.Y. ALCO. BEv. CONT. LAW § 79-c to -d (McKinney 2006).
167. § 79-c(1).
168. See W. Blake Gray, High court lets wine flow more freely; The Winners:
Small wineries are "popping corks and celebrating', SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, May 17, 2005, at Al (noting that New York has over two hundred

wineries and that an attempt to ban all direct shipment of wine would,
politically speaking, be difficult).
169. See Press Release, Office of Governor George Pataki, Governor, Senate

Majority Leader, Speaker Announce Agreement on Legislation to Bolster New
York's Wine Industry (June 24, 2005), available at http'//72.14.203.104

/search?q=cache:eim8gg8mDgJ:www.state.ng.us/governor (noting that the
wine industry in New York is one of the fastest growing segments of
agriculture in the state and that the new legislation will "openD the doors to
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In Michigan, Governor Jennifer Granholm signed legislation7
which also allows for the direct shipment of wine to consumers.1 0
Governor Granholm described the legislation as a way to comply
with the Court's decision in Granholm and protect jobs in the
State.71
III.

LIFE AFTER GRANHOLM

-

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS FOR STATES

While only the laws of New York and Michigan were struck
down in Granholm, six other states have laws similar to those in
question.172 In Granholm, the states claimed that striking down
these laws would remove the states' ability to tax, 73 and increase
the risk of minors making underage purchases.
As noted above,
both of the arguments were rejected by the Court. 7' That said,
any proposed legislation must protect state interests in protecting
minors and generating revenue. This section will propose the
major tenants that must be included in new direct-shipment laws
for states that are now forced to rewrite their
laws, highlighting
77
76
the recently enacted legislation in New York and Michigan.
A. Licensing, Reporting, and Taxation
Any direct-shipment legislation must include a requirement
for both in-state and out-of-state shippers to apply for and receive
a renewable license in order to ship wine directly to consumers.
new markets across the nation that were previously closed" to New York
wineries).
170. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.1203 (West 2006).
171. See Press Release, Office of Governor George Pataki, Governor
Granholm Signs Wine Shipment Legislation, Supports Michigan's Wine
Industry (December 15, 2005), available at http'//www.michigan.gov/
gov/0,1607,7-168-23442_21974-132248-M_2005_12,00.html ("This legislation
represents a compromise that will comply with the Supreme Court and, more

importantly, protect our local economies.").
172. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Lifts Ban on Wine Shipping, N.Y. TIMES,

May 16, 2005, at Al (noting that Connecticut, Massachusetts, Florida, Ohio,
Indiana and Vermont have laws similar to New York and Michigan which bar
direct shipments from out-of-state but allow them for wineries in-state).
173. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1906. Justice Kennedy, in the opinion for the
Court, stated that while the taxation argument was not "wholly illusory," its
purpose could be fulfilled by nondiscriminatory means. Id.
174. Id. at 1905.
175. Id. at 1905-06. Justice Kennedy pointed out that the States provided
"little evidence" that underage purchases were at all a problem. Id. In fact,
citing the FTC REPORT, supra note 1, the Court stated that "the staff of the
FTC found that the 26 States currently allowing direct shipments report no
problems with minors' increased access to wine." Id. Justice Kennedy also
noted that even if the Court accepted the States' arguments, "this would not
justify regulations limiting only out-of-state direct shipments." Id. at 1905-06.
176. N.Y. ALCO. BEv. CONT. LAW § 79-c-d (McKinney 2006).
177. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.1203 (West 2006).
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Licensing helps ensure compliance with that state's laws by
providing states with a vehicle to track who is selling wine into
and within the state. Both New York and Michigan now require
in-state and out-of-state wineries to apply for and receive a "direct
shippers" license.'78
Along with license applications, states often require so-called
application fees, and the direct shipper's license should be no
exception. That said, state's need to be mindful of the fact that if
they exact exorbitant fees, small producers will be less likely to
ship into that state for small orders as the costs can quickly
become prohibitive, especially for small producers operating on
Finally, while a state may require separate
tight margins.
licenses for in-state and out-of-state shippers, the key following
Granholm is to ensure that both licenses treat the wineries the
same regardless of whether they are in-state or out-of-state
shippers.179
Along with licensing, states should also require wineries to
file reports with a liquor control agency within that state. The
reports should include information about individual purchasers in
the state, quantities shipped per shipment, and total quantities
shipped into or within that state. This information will assist both
as an audit mechanism and in enforcement of any restrictions as
to quantities allowed. New York currently requires licensees to
report on a semi-annual basis, 8 ' while Michigan requires
quarterly reporting as to individual shipments made and total
quantities shipped.' Again, keeping in mind that many of these
wineries are small businesses, overly burdensome reporting may
also stifle growth and therefore states should consider
streamlining the process by utilizing new technology and webbased reporting.
The reporting requirements are essential for the next
suggestion: requiring the wineries to pay taxes. Any directshipment law must require shippers to pay all applicable state or
local taxes. As state and local governments struggle with tighter

178. See N.Y. ALcO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 79-c(2), (6).

(requiring wineries to

submit an application for the license which, if granted, must be renewed by
the winery annually); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.1203(3)(a), (9)(a)
and (b), and (10) (requiring that winery shippers hold a license).

179. New York, for example, has separate licenses for in-state shippers and
out of state, but the requirements are essentially the same. Compare N.Y.
ALco. BEV. CONT. LAW § 79-c (explaining requirements for direct shippers
outside of New York), with § 79-d (explaining requirements for direct shippers
in New York).
180. N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 79-c(3)(c). The law requires the licensee
to report the name, address, and quantities shipped to each purchaser for that
period. Id.
181.

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.1203(3)(i).
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budgets, any loss of tax revenue will be felt if consumers shift from
buying wine at the local retailer to shopping on the internet.
Therefore, it is essential that states require any direct shipper to
pay taxes, and to do so as if the transaction occurred at the place
of delivery. Both New York 82 and Michigan183 currently require
shippers to pay taxes to the State. It is also important to note that
collecting
taxes from out-of-state businesses is not new for
4
states.
While these requirements may seem cumbersome, wineries
already are required to report much of this information to their
home state regulatory agencies. Also, with the use of technology
and the ability to file reports electronically, meeting these
requirements can easily become routine.'
That said, lawmakers
should be cognizant of the fact that many of these producers and
shippers are small operations and requirements that are overly
burdensome may prohibit some wineries from shipping into or
within states, or stifle their growth.
B. Sales to Minors
Prohibiting alcohol from getting into the hands of minors has
long been a centerpiece in the direct-shipment debate. With that
in mind, one of the primary goals of any direct-shipment law
should be to limit the availability of alcohol to minors. While there
are a number of ways to address concerns about illegal sales to
minors, the essential components must include: first, requiring a
purchaser to represent his or her age at the time of purchase;
second, supplementing that representation with physical
verification upon delivery; and third, requiring that the delivery
package be labeled as containing alcohol and stating that proof of
age is required upon receipt.
182. N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAW § 79-c(3)(f). The law states that "the
amount of such taxes to be determined on the basis that each sale in this state
was at the location where delivery is made." Id.
183. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 436.1203(3)(i). Earlier legislation in
Michigan also required the placing of tax stamps on the outside of the
shipping containers, that requirement was stricken from the final legislation.

Id. at 3(f).
184. See Martin, supra note 79, at 94-97 (noting that while collecting taxes
on direct shipments of wine can pose challenges for States, they are not new

and not specific to wine). Martin further notes that the challenge here is the
same as that for all internet sales, as well as catalogues and the mail-order
business in general. Id.

185. It is worth noting that, as Justice Kennedy mentioned in Granholm,
Michigan currently collects taxes directly from out-of-state wineries for all
wine shipped into the State to wholesalers. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1906.
Justice Kennedy went on to state that "[i]f licensing and self-reporting provide
adequate safeguards for wine distributed through the three-tier system, there
is no reason to believe they will not suffice for direct shipments." Id.
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As to the first component, consumers should be required to
verify their age at the time of purchase using an age verification
service or agreeing to a statement that they represent they are of
proper age. New York law mandates that the direct shipper
require each purchaser to "represent that they are at least twentyone years of age,"" while Michigan requires that the winery either
verifies the age of the purchaser by obtaining a copy of their photo
identification or utilizes an "identification verification service.""' 8 7
As to the second component, verification upon delivery,
whether the responsibility is on the winery or the common carrier,
there must be a requirement for proof of age upon delivery. In
cases of failure to provide proof, there must be a mandate that the
shipment be returned. This second step is a necessary physical
check to ensure that alcoholic beverages are ordered by and
delivered only to adults. New York places the responsibility on the
licensee to require the common carrier to obtain the recipient's
proof of age," and refuse delivery if the recipient appears
However,
underage or refuses to provide identification. 89
Michigan places the responsibility on the common carrier to verify
190
age.
Third, as to labeling, direct-shipment laws must require that
a label be affixed to the outside of the delivery package stating
that it contains alcohol and that proof of age is required upon
delivery. This labeling makes it clear to both the person delivering
the package and the person receiving it that the contents in the
package are alcohol and proof of age is required. Both New York 9'
and Michigan.9' require labeling as part of their direct-shipment
law.

186. N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAW § 79-c(3)(d).
187. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.1203(3)(d).

The Michigan legislation

also requires that the order form used by the direct shipper be approved by the
State liquor commission and contain the name, address, date of birth and
telephone number of the person placing the order. A duplicate of this form
must then be provided to the State. Id.
188. N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAW § 79-c(3)(e)(i).
189. § 79-c(3)(e)(iii).

If the common carrier
190. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.1203(5).
determines that the person receiving delivery is not of age, the Michigan law
requires the delivery person to return the liquor to the shipper. Id. To that
end, if the shipment is in fact returned to the shipper due to the inability to
verify age, the law holds the delivery person harmless for damages suffered by
the purchaser or shipper. Id.
191. See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 79-c(3)(b). The labeling requirement
in New York also requires that the label read "NOT FOR RESALE." Id.
192. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.1203(2)(f), (3)(f) (requiring a label
that indicating the package contains alcohol).
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C. Additional Key Components
In addition to taxation and ensuring that minors are not
allowed to purchase wine through direct shipment, there are
additional features that direct- shipment legislation must include.
1.

Jurisdiction

In order to ensure enforcement of state statutes, it is critical
to include a jurisdictional statement in any direct-shipment
legislation. This requirement can be part of the license application
and provide that any out-of-state licensee submits to the
jurisdiction of that state in order to receive a license. This
requirement makes it easier for the state to bring an out-of-state
party before the courts and administrative agencies of that state.9
New York and Michigan's regulatory schemes each require that
the direct-shipper licensee submit to the jurisdiction of that
State. 9
2. Limits on Quantities Shipped
States must establish limits on quantities allowed for
shipment by direct shippers. By limiting the quantities, states are
better able to control the amount of alcohol within their borders,
enhance enforcement, and collect tax revenue.
Michigan limits a winery's shipment to no more than 1,500
nine-liter cases of wine into Michigan annually. 95 New York,
however, limits a producer's shipment to no more than thirty-six
nine-liter cases of wine per year to a resident of the State."
The National Conference of State Legislatures, Task Force on
the Wine Industry, adopted a model direct-shipment bill which
sets the limit at twenty-four bottles, or two cases per month. 97

193. Congress has also passed the Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement
Act, 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2000), which allows states' Attorneys General to bring an
action in federal court to enforce a State's direct shipment laws. See also
Foust, supra note 14, at 688-98 (discussing the Twenty-first Amendment

Enforcement Act, its purpose, and the constitutional implications of the Act
prior to its passage).
194. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.1203(3)(k) (mandating that direct
shipper licensees submit to the State's Jurisdiction); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT.
LAW § 79-c(3)(h) (requiring a written consent to the State's jurisdiction).
195. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.1203(3)(h).
196. See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 79-c(3)(a).
197. This model bill was proposed by the Coalition for Free Trade, The Wine
Institute, and the American Vintners Association, and adopted by the
National Conference of State Legislatures. See Free the Grapes: To Ensure
Consumer Choice in Fine Wine, Model Direct Shipment Bill, Section 1,
available at http://www.freethegrapes.org/wineries.html#model. The language
of section one of the model bill reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, any person
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This approach, two cases a month or twenty-four cases a year per
producer, is the most reasonable as it allows more consumers
access to direct-shipment while, in effect, ensuring against any
stockpiling, and limiting the development of a secondary market.
Finally, a provision limiting the amount allowed to be shipped
may resolve the legislative battle that appears to be taking place
in a number of states between wineries and liquor distributors. In
Illinois for example, liquor distributors proposed to limit the sale
to two cases per year while wineries sought to have the limit set at
thirty-six cases.9
Whether a state limits the amount of wine a
resident of that state can receive or limits the total amount any
single producer can ship into a state in a given year, some limit
must be set.
3. Limitationfor Personal Use
To further enhance enforcement efforts and ensure the
payment of taxes, direct-shipment laws should limit purchases by
direct shipment to individual or personal use only. Making it
unlawful to resell wine purchased through direct shipment is
critical to ensuring that a secondary market for wine does not
develop. This would also ensure that all applicable taxes are paid,
whether it is a state or local sales tax, and also that retailers are
properly licensed and registered with the state or local
government body. New York and Michigan both prohibit the resale
of wine purchased through a direct shipper."

currently licensed in this or any other state as a wine producer,
supplier, importer, wholesaler, distributor or retailer who obtains a
Wine Direct Shipper license, as provided below, may ship up to twentyfour (24) 9-liter cases of wine annually directly to a resident of [State]
who is at least 21 years of age for such resident's personal use and not
for resale.

Id.
198. See Cheryl V. Jackson, Wine, Beer Interests Agree to Sales Deals,
CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at 61 (reporting on the legislative battle

between wineries and wholesalers in the Illinois General Assembly as to the
amount of wine allowed for direct shipment); see also Tresa Baldas, Put Down
Your Glasses: Suits Over Wine Shipments Continue; News, THE RECORDER,
Mar. 27, 2006, at 2 (noting that the battle between wholesalers and wineries is
taking place in a number of states including Illinois).
199. N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 79-c(1). The New York law clearly states
that a direct-shipper licensee can only ship wine "for such resident's personal
use and not for resale."
Id.; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 436.1203(11)(h). The Michigan law however states that a direct shipper can
only sell to a consumer and defines a consumer as "an individual who
purchases wine for personal consumption and not for resale." Id. at
§ 436.1203(11)(e).

2007]

The Twenty-First Amendment Takes Another Hit
CONCLUSION

During this volatile time in the wine industry, as small
wineries continue to grow and the wholesale wine business
consolidates," states must look at the numerous options available
as they review their own laws following Granholm. States must
be creative in developing these laws as they balance the promotion
of fledgling domestic wine production against protecting the health
and safety of their citizens.
More importantly, as Granholm makes clear, the key for any
state is that the legislation must treat in-state and out-of-state
wineries the same. Any difference between the way out-of-state
interests and in-state interests are treated may provoke a
constitutional challenge." 1 The best solution for states is to open
their markets to direct shipment for private consumption, thereby
promoting their own wine industry and protecting the health,
welfare, and safety through the three-tier system.

200. There is an outstanding question as to whether the holding in
Granholm will be applied to beer, especially so called "micro brews" and
liquor. States need to keep this in mind as the craft new legislation.
201. See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Hoen, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1256 (W.D.
Wash. 2005) (relying on Granholm to invalidate a Washington State statute
which allowed only in-state wine and beer producers to bypass the three-tier
system and ship directly to retailers); see also Cherry Hill Vineyards v.
Hudgins, NO. 3:05CV-289-S, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93266, at *70 (W.D. Ky.,
Dec. 26, 2006) (relying on Granholm to strike down the "in person"
requirement for direct shipment of wine). The statute required a purchaser to
be present at the winery in order for the wine to be legally shipped into the
state. Id. at *17. The Court held that this requirement discriminates "in
practical effect" against interstate commerce. Id. at *70.

